University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 18
Number 1 Fall, 1987

Article 12

1987

Recent Developments: Maryland v. Garrison:
Good-Faith Mistake in Valid but Overbroad Search
Warrant Does Not Invalidate Search
Amy Kushner

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kushner, Amy (1987) "Recent Developments: Maryland v. Garrison: Good-Faith Mistake in Valid but Overbroad Search Warrant
Does Not Invalidate Search," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol18/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

vide him with an opportunity to refuse to
speak with his wife, or tell him in advance
that police officer would be present and
the conversation recorded. The majority
found no evidence to suggest that the
police had acted to allow the meeting "for
the purpose of eliciting incriminating
statements," Id. at 1936, and upheld the
trial judge's decision to admit the taped
conversation. Indeed, the Court found the
officers acted to discourage the meeting
entirely, and only stipulated to having an
-officer present to ensure the safety of Mrs.

Mauro.Id.
The opinion espoused by the Court in

Mauro narrows the interpretation of Innis
with respect to action by the police in lieu
of direct interrogation of suspects. The
Court now permits the police to obtain by
proxy that which they can not obtain
directly, voluntary self-incriminating statements made in the course of a predetention meeting between an accused and '
a spouse. Such statements may now be
used against a defendant at trial~ despite
police orchestration of and participation in
any such meeting, and notwithstanding
the defendant's prior assertion of his
Miranda rights under the fifth amendment.

- Mark Brugh
Maryland v. Garrison: GOOD-FAITH
MISTAKE IN VALID BUT
OVERBROAD SEARCH WARRANT
DOES NOT INVAUDATE SEARCH
As a result of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Maryland 'D. Garrison,
U.S. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987), the Rehnquist
Court has carved, yet, another good-faith
exception to the warrant requirement. In
Garrison, the Court held that' a factual mistake made in good-faith by police officers
did not invalidate a broader than appropriate Search warrant or its accompanying
search. The search, the Court explained,
was only limited by the police officers' discovery of their factual mistake.
In Garrison, "Baltimore police officers
obtained and executed a warrant to search
the person of Lawrence McWebb and the
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue
third floor apartment." Id. at 1014. The
search was for controlled substances and
related paraphernalia.
At the time the police obtained the warrant and began their search they were of
the belief that only one apartment existed
on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue.
Information was obtained from an informant that McWebb was selling marijuana
from this third floor apartment. A telephone call to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company confirmed that there was
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one apartment situated on the third floor,
thereby corroborating the police officers'
belief. Although the police inspected the
outside of the seven unit building, the
building was not approached until the warrant was executed. The third floor, which
had a common doorway and vestibule, was
divided into two separate units - one
belonging to McWebb and the other to
respondent, Garrison. Before the police
officers became aware of their mistake,
they searched' Garrison's apartment and
seized contraband in violation of
Maryland's Controlled Substances Act.
Md. Ann. Code art. 27 §276 (1957).
A Maryland trial court denied Garrison's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. Id.
58 Md. App. 417, 473, A.2d 514 (1984).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d 193 (1985).
In a 6-3 decision, the United States
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, divided the case
into two constitutional issues. The first
considered the validity of the warrant and
the second, the reasonableness of the way
the police officers executed the warrant.
As to the validity of the warrant, "[t]he
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance
of any warrant except one particularly
describing the place to be search and the
person's or things to be seized." Id. at
1017. Because Garrison made no claim that
the warrant did not adequately describe
"the persons or things to be seized" or
that there was no probable cause to believe
that they might be in "the place to be searched" as specified in the warrant, the
Court held that this Fourth Amendment
particularity-of-description requirement
was met. The issue, Stevens said, becomes
"whether that factual mistake (i.e., believing only McWebb's apartment existed on
the third floor) iqvalidated a warrant that
undoubtedly would have been valid if it
had reflected a completely accurate
understanding of the building's floor
plan." Id.
This issue, Stevens continued, turns on
the constitutionality of the police officers'
"conduct in light of the information
available to them at the time they acted."
Id. The majority found that the police officers reasonable believed, based on the
information they had gathered, that only
McWebb's apartment occupied the third
floor. Thus, the Court concluded, "the
warrant, insofar as it authorized a search
that turned out ambiguous in scope, was
valid when it issued." Id. at 1018.
Next, the Court addressed the
reasonableness of the way in which the

police officers executed the warrant. The
majority stated that the police had gained
access to the third floor common area
legally; "they carried a search warrant and
they were accompanied by McWebb who
provided the key to the third floor." Id. at
1018. Thus, the Court only considered the
police officers' conduct in executing the
warrant once they entered the third floor
common area.
The majority stated that the police officers were required to discontinue the search of Garrison's apartment once they
discovered or should have discovered that
the third floor contained two apartments
instead of the assumed one. However, "the
Court has also recognized the need to
allow some latitude for honest mistakes
that are made by officers in the dangerous
and difficult process of making arrests and
executing search warrants." Id. at 1018.
Citing HiD 'D. California, 401 U.s. 797
(1971), for the proposition that honest mistakes in arrests obviate' Fourth Amendment concerns, the majority held that "the
officers' conduct was consistent with a
reasonable effort to ascertain and identify
the place intended to be searched within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 1019. Before their discovery of the
factual mistake, the majority stated the
officers understandably and reasonably
believed that "McWebb's apartment and
the third-floor premises as one and the
same." Id. 'The execution of the warrant,
the majority held, reasonably included the
entire third floor and consequently, the
contraband found on that floor was properly admissible.
Justice Blackmun, along the Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented. A person,
Blackmun opined, has the highest expectation of privacy in his home, whether it be
a mobile home, a unit in a multipleoccupancy dwelling, or the most majestic
mansion. Indeed, "the physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed." Id. at 1020. (Blackmum, J. dissenting) Therefore, absent one of the warrant requirement exceptions as stated in
Coolidge 'D. New Hampshsire, 403 U.S. 443,
478 (1971), a warrantless search of a home
is presumptively unreasonable.
In concluding, that the search of Garrison's apartment was warrantless and therefore improper, the dissent did not believe
the particularity-of-description requirement of the search warrant was met. This
particularity requirement applies with
equal force to multi-unit buildings as to
individual private homes, requiring that
the targeted unit be described with enough
specificity to prevent a search of all units.
Garrison at 107 S.Ct. 1021. When applying

this long standing law to this case, the dissent found that the warrant specified that
only McWebb's apartment could be searched. Therefore, the search of Garrison's
apartment was warrantless and because the
state did not advance any exceptions to the
warrant requirement, all evidence seized
from the search should have been suppressed.
In addition, the dissent found the majority's analysis concerning the reasonableness
of the way in which the warrant was
executed to be unpersuasive. Because
multiple-occupancy buildings are now
common, the conduct of the officers could
hardly be deemed reasonable. The dissent
found any reasonable basis for the search
to be lacking because the police failed to
thoroughly investigate the premises before
obtaining the warrant; failed to question
Garrison prior to beginning the search as
to the location of his residence, and failed
to take into account the obvious lay-out of
the third floor which revealed two separate apartments. As viewed by the dissent,
these facts, would have enabled a
reasonable officer to realize the factual
mistake before any contraband was seized.
Garrison, provides another example of
the Supreme Court's willingness to broaden the good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement. Although case-by-case analysis can only determine if the good-faith
exception to the warrant requirement has
been fulfilled, if Garrison is the benchmark
by which good-faith is measured then it
seems clear that in most cases good-faith
will be found.

- Amy Kushner
First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles:
TIlE EVOLUTION OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSECOURT REQUIRES MONETARY
COMPENSATION FOR
TEMPORARY REGULATORY
TAKING OF PROPERTY
Marred by a history of incomplete clarification, the issue of whether a landowner
is entitled to compensation for a temporary regulatory taking of property pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause of
the fifth amendment of the United States
Constituion has finally been settled in First

English Evangelical Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(1987), (First English). Historically, the
remedy for a taking of property by inverse
condemnation was invalidation of the
unconstitutional regulation, but the
United States Supreme Court in First
English has authoritatively held in a 6-3

decision that monetary relief is an acceptable remedy.
The First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale owned and operated a camp
(Lutherglen) for handicapped children in
Angles Natural Forest. In February of
1978 a storm flooded the watershed. The
massive infusion of water forced the Mill
Creek, which ran through Lutherglen, to
overflow its banks. Consequently, the
property was inundated, the buildings
were destroyed and the camp was rendered
useless unless rebuilt.
Subsequently, in response to an everpresent hazardous flood condition posed by
an earlier topographic change in the Mill
Creek Canyon, Los Angeles County
adopted an ordinance, which read in part,
"[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct,
place or enlarge any building or structure,
any portion of which is, or will be, located
within the outer boundry lines of the
interim flood protection area located in
Mill Creek Canyon." Id. at 2381-2382,
cltmg Los Angeles, Ca., Interim
Ordinance No. 11,855 (Jan. 1979) (emphasis added). The law adversely affected the
Church's interest in Lutherglen, prohibiting its reconstruction.
In response to the regulation the Church
filed suit in the Superior Court of California alleging that the law denied the church
of all use of the property. FollowingAgins
v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), the court
denied relief by inverse condemnation.
Agins stands for the proposition that maintenance of a suit for damages in inverse
condemnation cases is the equivalent of
coercing the state to exercise its eminent
domain powers. Thus the only relief, in
California, when a regulation was found a
denial of a substantial amount of property
rights would have been declaratory relief
or mandamus. See, Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
On appeal, the California Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court decision
on similar grounds and, "because the
United States Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on the question of whether a state
may constitutionally limit the remedy for
a taking to nonmonetary relief." 107 S.Ct.
2383. The Church appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 478 U.S. - 0 106
S.Ct. 3292 (1986). In prior cases seeking to
address the issue, the Court had refused to
settle the matter because in those appeals
the Court had deemed each case as "not
ripe" or "lacking finality." Se~ Mac·

Donald, Sommers and Frates v. Yolo Coun·
ty 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986) (A lack of a fmal
determination by a county planning board
as to how to apply a regulation prevents a
decision of whether a taking has occur-

red.), Williamson County Regional Plan

ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985) (Petitioners failure to exhaust
all state remedies to resolve a situation,
[i.e. application for a zoning variance, following state administrative procedures to
collect compensation before filing suit,]
renders the case as pending therefore precluding a decision by the Court for a lack
of finality at the state level.), San Diego Gas
andElec. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981)
(When a state court decision is not final,
the Court cannot review the case pursuant
to 28 U.S.c. § 1257.), Agins v. Tiburon,
4n U.S. 255 (1980).
Despite the fact that the ordinance had
yet to be deemed unconstitutional as a taking of property without providing just
compensation, the Court did address the
compensation issue. Seegenerally, 107 S.Ct.
at 2389-2390 (Where the dissenting opinion refuses to agree with the majority
opinion because of the "lack of finality"
issue).
In its opinion, the Court noted that the
Just Compensation clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the states throught the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, a state is
required to financially compensate a property owner for an actual physical taking.
Furthermore, under Mahon, a regulation
may be so excessive that it works a taking
under inverse condemnation theory, denying the property owner of the use of the
land without taking the property itself. Id.
at 2386. The Court perceived no difference
in the circumstances when a state physically deprives a landowner of its rights by
eminent domain and when the depravation is perpetrated by regulatory encroachment. Thus, because there are not
distinguishing differences between eminent domain and inverse condemnation
takings, the Court held that the just compensation clause warrants monetary compensation in the regulatory taking
situation.
Under the facts in First English, the
petitioner-Church alleged a taking for the
period commencing from the time when
the ordinance because effective accruing
up until when the regulation would be
struck down. Typically, U[o]nce a court
determines that a taking has occurred, the
government retains the whole range of
options already available-amendment of
the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or the exercise of eminent domain," Id. at 2389, thus leaving the
property owner harmed for the period of
time in which the law was effective. Until
First English. landowners had no opportunity to recover damages for the "regulatory wrongs" of local government.
Siding with the Church's argument, the
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